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Muslims outside the own group serve as simultaneously reference points and stakeholders in the constructions of Islam:
The issue is one not only of recasting an Islamic identity, but also of formulating it in explicit terms. Resorting to an explicit formulation is important, because it obliges one to make choices and to disentangle the different and often contradictory levels of practices and discourses where a religion is embedded in a given culture. Especially in times of political crisis (such as 9/11:, ordinary Following Eickelman and Piscatori's theory that the 'objectified' Islam that is the fruit of modern public culture and mass education is largely independent of traditional religious authorities (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996; Roy 2004: 21) , Roy argues that these public reconstructions of Islam have become the task of ordinary Muslims, not of learned authorities: 'This task falls on the shoulders of every Muslim, rather than on legitimate religious authorities, simply because, as we shall see, there are so few or no established Muslim authorities in the West' (Roy 2004: 24) . The fact that neo-fundamentalist definitions of Islam are independent of traditional authorities, both in terms of defining and enforcing religion, makes them more similar to western Christianity and western new religious movements than to traditional Islam (Roy 2004:26-29, ch. 4-5) . According to Haykel three factors define Salafism: theology, law, and criteria for political action. Theology provides the boundary between Salafis and other Muslims.
All Salafis agree on a creed ('aqida) of absolute tawhid ('affirmation of God's Oneness') and belief in the uncreated nature of God's eternal attributes (sifat:, including the Qur'an as His eternal speech. On the basis of their creed they reject other Sunni and Shiite doctrines, and the idea that man-made laws could substitute for God's shari'a. Legal issues, however, are not significant as markers of identity.
Salafis affirm that competent legal scholars should practice ijtihad (independent interpretation by applying reason to the Qur'an and hadith) and in doing so consult all the law schools, rather than only one, and that non-jurists should follow (ittaba'a) the rulings of Salafi scholars. Thus Salafis do not allow non-scholars to make their own interpretations in the way Roy says is typical of neo-fundamentalism.
If the creed defines Salafism towards the exterior, political action divides it internally: whether it is allowed, for what reasons, and by which means (Haykel 2009: 47-51; cf. Wiktorowicz 2006) . Using Salafi terminology, Haykel distinguishes between three positions: jihadi Salafism, which seeks by violent means to establish God's rule on earth through a legitimate caliphate; haraki ('movement') Salafism which is often influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, as it advocates applying tawhid through non-violent politics in order to change and Islamize society Ulrika Mårtensson, Haraikî Salafism in Norway Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, The Nordic Welfare State, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2014 195 and government; and 'ilmi ('scholarly') Salafism which denounces political activism unless commanded by the ruler, and focuses on purification of Muslims' knowledge and practice of Islam (Haykel 2009:48-51 ).
Haykel's categories correspond to Quintan Wiktorowicz's terms 'jihadist', 'politico' and 'purist' (Wiktorowicz 2006 In epistemological terms, this concept of discourse does not imply that there is no objective knowledge about a subject-matter: it means that discourse may obstruct us from gaining accurate knowledge about a subject-matter. De Certeau thus encourages a kind of 'resistance' which is simultaneously within and against a discourse. What enables resistance is the subject level. The individual author's subject is always different from the other subject-positions that make up the discourse, which implies that the subject can take a critical distance from discourse even as s/he is part of it. This is why a discourse is continuously changing.
The same approach is reflected also in de Certeau's sociologically oriented work (1980/1984 The implication is that even arguments that challenge the political order's claim to recognition must be included in public discourse.
Religion's public re-emergence in the form of private interest groups and as contested subject matter in public debates illustrates the legitimacy problem (Habermas 2002 (Habermas , 2005a (Habermas , 2005b (Habermas , 2008 . Religious citizens are not included in public discourse on the same terms as other citizens due to the exclusive nature of their arguments and concepts and the equally exclusive approach towards religion manifested by increasingly vociferous ideological secularists. This exclusion of religious citizens from public deliberation over the common good poses a new challenge to democratic legitimacy.
Given that Habermas sees the problem as one of public understanding ('intelligibility', with de Certeau), his proposed solution is a translation process where religious citizens translate religious concepts into secular counterparts and vice versa, so that a civic vocabulary is created which enables religious citizens to communicate to the public the implications of religious arguments for the common good (Habermas 2007:16-19 ).
Habermas' envisioned translation process is connected with his concept of 'post-secular society', by which he means a society where government and law, and science and public education, are institutionally autonomous from religion but hyper-conscious of religion's significance. If public debates during most of the twentieth century were largely oblivious of religion, post-secular consciousness is aware that modernity has not led to the disappearance of religion and that it plays an important role in global conflicts. There is public awareness, too, that the religious actors who claim authority to interpret relations between religion and society belong to the immigrant communities that embody the challenges that European countries face as they seek to balance cultural diversity and social cohesion (Habermas 2008:19-20) . To overcome tensions, both religious and non-religious citizens must be able to see religion as a resource for the common good, hence the need for translation. 
Norwegian dialogue discourse and Islam Net
In public discourse, however, Norway strongly identifies with a Habermasian ideal of according to Bangstad and Linge (2013) , 280,000 NOK in 2012. The venue was an indoor sports arena in a nice villa suburb of Oslo. On the tram to the conference on the third and last day we met three young women dressed up in niqab (the full face veil) for the occasion. It was clearly the first time they had worn such a garment, and they had to struggle a bit with it, which made them giggly and up-beat -a sentiment enhanced by disapproving glares from the other tram passengers.
The conference was gender segregated. Men and women entered through separate entrances and sat at different ends of the conference hall, men at the front and women at the back, but without separating walls. The majority of the young women wore hijab, only a few niqab. There were also those who did not wear Islamic dress at all. On the second day a news team from Norwegian television was at the women's entrance interviewing conference participants about the gender segregated arrangement. Both the young and the older women they asked said that they prefer gender separate seating and entrances, since they do not feel comfortable queuing or sitting next to unknown men.
In common for all the preachers was the message that any problems facing Theology in the proper sense was dealt with by Abdur-Raheem Green. Referring to al-'Uthaymin, he explained that Islam is only true when it is anchored in the believer's purified heart, which is where knowledge about God is located. The heart's knowledge about God is the source of inner peace, tranquility and equanimity, which is required if the believer is to resist temptations and sin. While Green was highly critical of traditional Sufism ('those who go Allahooohohoooo': for its worship of Sufi shaykhs as intermediaries between men and God, it is worth noting that al-'Uthaymin's theology of the heart itself is probably inspired by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani's ascetic Sufism to which al-'Uthaymin's main source of inspiration, the great Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), belonged.
Another important Salafi topic which Green addressed was al-wala' wa'l-bara', 'loyalty and disavowal', which derives from the Qur'an 5:51: 'O believers, take not Jews and Christians as friends; they are friends of each other. Whoso of you makes them his friend is one of them' (Arberry's translation). Here Green again referred to al-'Uthaymin, even though it appears that he constructed a highly independent argument. Regarding married life, Riad Ouarzazi gave a fantastically humorous performance on the importance of expressing emotion within the family, which involved 'marrying' a member of the male audience. His message was a powerful antidote to traditional gender roles where especially men are taught to restrain expressions of affection, even within the family. Using hadith, Ouarzazi showed how the Prophet openly displayed affection for his wives, and how he and Aisha used to joke and laugh a lot, and compete and race together, and that the Prophet never objected when she beat him in running.
Instead he fed her so much meat that she became all dull and slow, and he could win.
Ouarzazi's message that husbands and wives should play and have fun and express affection for each other resonates with young Norwegian Muslims' views on the good atmosphere in the family. Those who had their parents in the audience were commanded to hug them, to practise overcoming embarrassment about displaying affection in public.
The general atmosphere at the conference was friendly and humorous. There were condemnations, however. Mohammed Abdul Jabbar gave a Doomsday sermon in which he condemned to hell those who claim to know when the end-times are and who invent their own signs of the end, as opposed to the correct approach which is to follow sound hadith on the matter and accept that only God knows when it is, even though it is certain to be near. University.
Concluding Analysis
The article aimed at defining Islam Net with reference to Salafism, and to its capacity for civic engagement. Regarding the first aim, it is found that at the meta-analytical level Islam Net corresponds to Roy's concept of neo-fundamentalism, since it (1) constructs Islam with reference to the scriptures, and in doing so (2) argue that 2000 individuals is such a small number that it does not matter whether they are able to explain their view in public debate, the Habermasian perspective implies the opposite: their non-participation on this issue is a democracy deficit on the part of the public institutions. Whatever the outcome of deliberations, representatives from these institutions should ideally accept an invitation to public dialogue, so that both parties can clarify their arguments publicly and 'translate' between the secular and the religious languages. If there remain principal disagreements after such a public discussion and the public institutions stand by their decisions, then at least the process of decision making is democratically legitimate in the eyes of those who lost the debate.
